
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE |
CONTACT: GEORGIA ECONOMOU |
June 12,
2004—No.41 |
(202)
785-8430 |
AHI sends letter to Secretary Colin L. Powell
AHI sends letter to Secretary Colin L. Powell on
1. Setting the record straight
on the Annan Plan; and
2. Cover-up of the State Department’s role in Turkey’s invasion
of Cyprus
WASHINGTON, DC—On June 18, 2004, AHI President Gene Rossides sent a letter to
Secretary Colin L. Powell on (1) setting the record straight on the
Annan Plan and (2) the cover-up of the State Department’s role in
Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974. The text of the letter follows:
June 18, 2004
The Honorable Colin L. Powell
Secretary of State
State Department
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
Re: Setting the record straight on the Annan Plan;
Cover-up of the State Department’s role in Turkey’s invasion
of Cyprus in 1974
Dear Mr. Secretary:
In view of the unseemly and undiplomatic attacks by U.S.
officials on the Greek Cypriots for their "no" vote of 76 percent on the Annan Plan for Cyprus and statements to reward the
Turkish Cypriots for their "yes" vote of 65 percent, I believe it is important to set the record straight on
the Annan Plan.
We have stated that the Annan Plan was unfair, unbalanced,
unworkable and not financially viable. The State Department
said it was fair and balanced. Let’s look at the facts to determine
who is correct.
The Greek Cypriot "no" vote of 76 percent and the Turkish Cypriot "yes" vote of 65 percent is statistical evidence of the unfairness and unbalanced
nature of the Annan Plan. If the yes and no votes had been close
to
a 50-50 mark, it could be argued that the plan was fair and
balanced. It
should also be pointed out that the illegal settlers were allowed
to vote in disregard of established international law.
In examining
various provisions of the plan it is clear on its face that the
plan is unfair, unbalanced and sharply
biased in
Turkey’s and the Turkish Cypriots’ favor. It actually wipes
out, believe it or not, Turkey’s aggression against Cyprus.
The
undemocratic veto for the 18 percent Turkish Cypriot minority
The
Annan Plan proposal was on its face undemocratic in that it
provided a veto
on all legislative and executive branch matters for the 18 percent
Turkish Cypriot minority. A Greek Cypriot proposal for a deadlock
breaking
mechanism was rejected by the Turkish Cypriots and Mr. Annan.
The
parliamentary system under the Annan Plan creates a minority veto
for the 18 percent Turkish Cypriot minority. The following
key legislative
matters among others would be subject to the Turkish Cypriot
veto:
1. Adoption of laws concerning taxation, citizenship and immigration;
2.
Approval of the budget; and
3. Election of the Presidential
Council.
This arrangement is clearly
undemocratic, a recipe for stalemate and harmful to all Cypriots.
The
minority veto is also present in the Presidential Council which
exercises the executive power of the component
state. Political
paralysis
in the exercise of executive power will be the result of this arrangement.
The
Annan Plan vetoes exceed the minority vetoes of the London-Zurich
1959-1960 agreements, which vetoes led to the breakdown of the Cyprus
constitution. A minority veto is undemocratic and repugnant to core
U.S. values.
Is the U.S. prepared to propose the Annan Plan’s minority
veto provisions for the 20 percent Kurdish minority of 15 million
in Turkey? Is
Turkey prepared
to give its Kurdish minority the same rights it seeks for the Turkish
Cypriots? What about the Arab minority in Israel, Turks in Bulgaria,
Albanians in
FYROM, Greeks in Albania and minorities in Africa, Asia and North
and South America?
The U.S. active assistance and support of the
British maneuvered Annan Plan is, frankly, an embarrassment to
our foreign policy.
Rather than supporting
undemocratic norms, the U.S. should promote with consistency
and vigor the democratic policy espoused for Cyprus by Vice President
George
H.W. Bush
on July 6, 1988:
"We seek for Cyprus a constitutional democracy
based on majority rule, the rule of law, and the protection of
minority rights."
Majority rule with protection of minority rights is a
unifying force. Minority vetoes are inherently a divisive force.
In
Afghanistan, a multi-ethnic country, the U.S. ambassador, Dr. Zalmay
Khalilzad, has successfully promoted a constitution
providing for
majority
rule, the rule of law and protection for minority rights.
Why has the U.S. not proposed a similar constitution for Cyprus?
The Annan
Plan
is a direct
contradiction to the Bush administration’s Middle East Initiative
for Democracy.
The proposal is unworkable
It is useful
to recall that the State Department’s
Bureau of Intelligence and Research called the 1959-1960
London-Zurich agreements dysfunctional. It accurately predicted the
problem
areas. The Annan Plan
is even more complicated and creates conditions for continuous
squabbling, disagreements
and deadlock.
The proposal subverts property rights
One of the most pernicious effects of the
illegal Turkish occupation of
northern
Cyprus is
that the rightful owners of real property there continue
to be
excluded from their property by the Turkish military. These
rightful owners
include
many
U.S. citizens. The Annan Plan proposes a highly complicated and uncertain regime for
resolving property issues and will compel many of the rightful
owners to accept an illusory form of compensation in the
form of "bonds" issued by the "federal Cypriot government" which is not obligated to guaranty the obligation evidenced by the "bonds." A legal effect of the proposed regime is that rightful property owners can be
forced against their will to relinquish their property
rights without adequate compensation. The property regime
in the
Annan Plan violates the European
Convention on Human Rights and international law.
Compounding
the illegality of the property regime, the Annan Plan proposes
that applications filed in the
European Court
of Human
Rights
be nullified
and deemed settled by virtue of the property regime under
the Annan Plan. This proposal means that the "federal Cypriot government" would unilaterally deprive any person claiming rightful title to property of
rights guaranteed under the European Convention of Human
Rights. While it is inconceivable that the European Court
of Human Rights would enforce such
a
proposal, the fact that it is in the Annan Plan at all
undermines the credibility and good faith basis of the
Annan Plan.
The property regime makes no provision to reimburse
the rightful property owners for the loss of use of their
property for the past
30 years. Instead,
the property regime requires the rightful property owners
to seek such reimbursement from the "Greek Cypriot constituent state" rather than from the actual tortfeasor which is Turkey. This means that the
rightful property owners can only be reimbursed from the
revenues of the "Greek Cypriot constituent state" which are composed of the taxes paid by these very same rightful property owners.
The
proposal is not financially viable
The cost of resettlement
including the infrastructure and related
costs in Famagusta/Varosha are huge—several billions of
dollars. No adequate estimate has been made. These costs should be
the responsibility of the Turkish government
and the Turkish military, which has billions of dollars in a reserve
fund.
The Security issue—the proposal fails to fully demilitarize
Cyprus and gives Turkey "intervention" rights
There is no need for Turkish or Greek soldiers to remain in Cyprus.
The U.S. should insist on full demilitarization now. The final
Annan Plan actually provides for the permanent presence of 650
Turkish
troops on Cyprus with the right of "intervention" by Turkey, a guarantor power under the 1959-1960 London Zurich agreements. With
Cyprus now a full member of the EU, there is no need for Britain,
Turkey or Greece to remain as guarantor powers.
The Annan Plan does
not provide for the immediate demilitarization of Cyprus. It provides
for the gradual withdrawal of Turkey’s 35,000/40,000
troops over 14 years with 650 remaining permanently. Earlier versions
of the Plan did not authorize any Turkish troops to remain.
How
could the UN Secretary-General propose or agree to any troops remaining—and
incredibly, with intervention rights? How
could he propose a 14 year period instead of immediate demilitarization?
There
is no security problem for the Turkish Cypriots. The opening of
the Green Line for crossings in Nicosia since
April 2003
has proven that there is no security problem for the Turkish
Cypriots.
As long ago as July 25, 1978, former Republican Senator
Bob Dole proposed demilitarization on the Senate floor during
the Senate
debate on the amendment,
which passed, to remove the remaining arms embargo on Turkey. Dole voted
against lifting the embargo and noted that "[n]egotiations between the two communities have remained stalemated over the
presence of the Turkish occupation force." He stated:
"The great need for demilitarization of Cyprus, involving withdrawal of both Greek
and Turkish forces, must be stressed. . . . Once demilitarization of
Cyprus is achieved, then the intercommunal talks between the Greek
and Turkish Cypriot
communities over the territorial and political settlement will proceed
much more smoothly. This must be the goal of all parties: to achieve
demilitarization
of Cyprus as soon as possible. . . . The President should also encourage
the strengthening of the U.N. security force on the island to assist
the demilitarization
and provide the protection necessary throughout this process. . . .
We do not seek to dilute the role of the UN in bringing peace to
Cyprus—we seek to
strengthen it. That role would be much more difficult . . . if we were
to resume arms sales and shipments to Turkey before her tens of thousands
of forces are
removed from the island. By upholding the rule of law, we encourage
its application and effectiveness in the future." 124 Cong. Rec. 22533-5 (1978).
Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President for defense
and foreign policy studies at CATO Institute in Washington, D.C.,
stated on May
19, 2004 at
the American Hellenic Institute conference on "Cyprus—The Road Ahead and U.S. Interests," that any new proposal for reunification of Cyprus must, at a bare minimum, "set a date certain for withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus," and "provide for the right of return for displaced persons."
It should be noted that the Treaty of Guarantee under the
London-Zurich Agreements did not authorize the use of "force" when it authorized "action." There is no mention of the word "force" in the Treaty. When Cyprus became a member of the UN in 1960, all provisions
of the London-Zurich Agreements in conflict with or inconsistent
with the UN Charter became null and void pursuant to article 103
of the Charter. Sir David
Hunt, former British High Commissioner in Cyprus, has written:
"There is therefore no escape from the two-pronged argument: first that Article
IV of the Treaty of Guarantee did not authorize the use of force;
secondly that if force was sanctioned under that article, then the
Treaty was void ab
initio as inconsistent with the Charter." (Hunt, "Cyprus: A Study in International Relations," the 1980 Montagne Burton Lecture on International Relations in the University
of Edinburgh, at page 11.)
Further, the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee
specifically state that any action taken must be for the sole
purpose of restoring
the status
quo ante.
The
proposal does not provide for the return to Turkey of the 119,000
illegal Turkish settlers in the occupied area.
Central
to a proper solution
is the return
of the 119,000 illegal Turkish settlers to Turkey except
for those who would be authorized to remain for humanitarian purposes.
The
drafters of the Annan Plan, primarily the British under Lord Hanney
with the assistance of the U.S. by Ambassador
Thomas
Weston, the
U.S. Cyprus
Coordinator, simply ignored the Geneva Convention of 1949
which prohibits the colonization of occupied territories by the occupying
power.
The U.S. and the
U.K. as signatories of the Geneva Convention are obligated
to respect and carry out its provisions.
The proposed territorial
adjustment
is clearly
unfair
The two proposed maps—A 28.6 percent and B 28.5 percent reward
Turkey, the aggressor and penalize the Greek Cypriots, the victims.
The
Turkish
Cypriots
comprise 18 percent of the population and have title
to about 14 percent of the land. A map
proposal should provide for no more than 18 percent under
Turkish Cypriot administration.
The Annan Plan and economic isolation/embargoes
One of the more egregious
aspects of the Annan Plan Report is the references in the Summary
and paragraphs 89 and 90 to "pressuring and isolating" the Turkish Cypriots as if this was the fault of the Greek Cypriots. Nothing
could be further from the truth.
How could this Report fail to state
that the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots was caused and continues
to be caused by
the 35,000/40,000 Turkish
occupation troops and the establishment by Turkey of the Green Line barbed
wire fence across the face of Cyprus. Remove the Turkish troops now and the
Green Line and economic conditions in the north will improve dramatically.
There
is no embargo. There is the rule of law. The European Court held
that trade goods from the occupied area could not be exported directly
but
had to go through the legitimate government of Cyprus and its Customs Service.
Also, the relatively poor economic conditions in the occupied area have
been caused in substantial part by Turkey’s introduction of the Turkish
lira as
the official currency and the Turkish bureaucrats who were sent to the
occupied area to run the economy.
The late President Ronald Reagan
in his historic statement standing before the Berlin Wall said: "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall." When are the UN and the U.S. going to state to the Turkish military and Prime
Minister Erdogan: "Remove your troops from Cyprus now and tear down this Green Line barbed wire
fence."
The opening of parts of the Green Line in Nicosia and the over
one million crossings by Greek and Turkish Cypriots has demonstrated
beyond a
doubt that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots can live and work together
and that there
is no security problem for Turkish Cypriots. The security problem that
remains is for Greek Cypriots because of the illegal presence of 35,000/40,000
Turkish
occupation troops.
The Annan Plan and the Rule of Law
The Annan Plan violates the rule of
law in a number of instances:
• UN Charter
The Annan Plan violates the UN Charter, article 2, paragraph
4 by not taking into account Turkey’s invasion of
Cyprus in 1974 which violated UN Charter
2(4) which prohibits the threat of and the use of force in
international disputes. This is a most serious violation because
it
weakens, if not destroys, this
fundamental provision of the UN Charter.
It also violates the unanimous UN
General Assembly Resolution 3212 of November 1, 1974
which calls for the removal of all foreign troops. Further,
that resolution was unanimously endorsed by Security Council
Resolution 365 on December 13, 1974.
It also violates numerous UN SC resolutions
calling for respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of Cyprus.
• Geneva Convention of 1949
As mentioned, the Geneva Convention of 1949, section
III, article 49, prohibits colonization by an occupying
power. Article 49 states in
its last
paragraph: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population
into the territory it occupies." Today there are estimates of 119,000 illegal Turkish colonists/settlers in Cyprus.
The failure of the Annan Plan to call for the return to Turkey
of the 119,000 illegal settlers to Turkey is a violation
of the Geneva Convention.
Mr. Secretary, you stated on June 13,
2004
on the ABC Sunday morning "This Week" program with George Stephanopoulos that President Bush has stated regarding
Iraq that he will follow all legal obligations and has
stated that he is bound by legal obligations under international
treaties. We call on
you
and the President
to do the same regarding Cyprus.
The guiding principle for
all the parties to the Annan Plan negotiations for a Cyprus
settlement should be the
rule of law.
The interested parties are not only
the immediate ones, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the guarantor
powers,
Britain, Greece and
Turkey,
and the
UN, but also the U.S. which caused the Cyprus
tragedy of 1974 by the illegal actions of the State Department
under Secretary of
State Henry
Kissinger.
What does it mean to stand by the rule
of law?
It means what President Dwight
D. Eisenhower stated during the 1956 Suez Crisis
when Britain, France and Israel committed
aggression in
late
October by invading Egypt to gain control
of the Suez Canal. In his memorable October
31, 1956 television and radio report to the
nation on the Middle East crisis he condemned that invasion.
President
Eisenhower
said:
"We believe these actions to have been taken in error, for we do not accept the
use of force as a wise or proper instrument
for the settlement of international disputes.
· · · ·
The present fact nonetheless seems clear. The action
taken can scarcely be reconciled with the
principles and purposes of
the UN to which
we have
all subscribed. And beyond this we are
forced to doubt that resort to force and
war will for long serve the permanent interests
of the attacking nations.
· · · ·
My fellow citizens, as I review the march of world
events in recent years I am ever more
deeply convinced that the UN represents
the soundest
hope for peace in the world. For this
very reason I believe that the
processes of
the UN need further to be developed and strengthened.
I
speak particularly of increasing its ability
to secure justice under international law.
In all the recent troubles
in the Middle East there have, indeed, been injustices suffered
by all nations involved.
But
I do not believe
that another
instrument of injustice—war—is a
remedy for these wrongs.
There can be no peace without law. And there
can be no law if we were to invoke one code
of international conduct
for
those who
oppose us
and another
for our friends. (Emphasis added)
· · · ·
The peace we seek and need means
much more than mere absence of war. It
means the
acceptance of law and
the fostering
of justice
in all
the world.
To our principles guiding us
in this quest we must stand fast. In so doing
we
can honor the
hopes of
all men
for a world
in which
peace will
truly
and justly reign."
Eisenhower succeeded in reversing
the aggression without firing a shot.
He used
diplomatic and economic
pressure and
the force of his
own stature.
Eisenhower would not have tolerated Turkey's
aggression one minute.
The rule of law
also means "that aggression cannot and will not pay" as set forth by President George H.W. Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev in
Helsinki on September 9, 1990 regarding
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Their historic joint
statement read in part:
"We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No
peaceful international order is possible
if larger states can devour their smaller
neighbors.
· · · ·
We are determined to see this
aggression end, and if the current
steps fail to end
it, we are prepared
to consider additional
ones consistent
with
the U.N. Charter. We must demonstrate
beyond any doubt that aggression
cannot and will not pay."
When are we going to apply
the Eisenhower Doctrine to Turkey?
When
are we going to apply the Bush/Gorbachev Doctrine to
Turkey?
The failure to apply
the rule of law to Turkey has
seriously
damaged
U.S.
interests
and
cost the
U.S. taxpayer
over 50 billion
dollars these
past decades.
The Annan Plan
needs to be changed to reflect the
Eisenhower
and Bush/ Gorbachev
Doctrines
in
the interests of all the
parties.
Turkey must be treated
as any other aggressor
nation would be treated.
Applying
the rule of
law to the Annan
Plan to make
it democratic, workable,
financially viable and
just will serve the cause of peace
and
security in
the region.
The Annan Plan
as presently written
reduces the UN to simply
following the
views of Britain,
the prime
drafter
of the
Annan
Plan, and the U.S.,
in support of the aggressor
Turkey. Britain, which
caused
the original
Cyprus problem
in the 1950's
by its divide
and rule
policy, has
substantial economic
interests in Turkey and
many Englishmen have
illegal title
to Greek Cypriot
properties in northern
occupied Cyprus.
The U.S. active
support of Britain's
actions makes
a mockery of our efforts
to build democratic
institutions in Iraq,
the rest
of the Middle
East and elsewhere.
The
U.S. should follow the historic
precedent set
by Eisenhower in
the Suez Crisis of 1956
by applying the
rule
of law to Turkey
and using diplomatic
and economic pressure
on Turkey to
end Turkey's aggression
and occupation in
Cyprus.
What the
U.S. needs is leadership
with the
political will
to act.
The failure to hold Turkey accountable for its aggression
against Cyprus
How could the Annan Plan fail to take into
account
Turkey’s aggression
against Cyprus and all the killings, rapes and destruction caused
by Turkey?
On the transnational level, the regional European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights) is, by the terms of its preamble, an
extension of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.
The government of Cyprus filed three applications to the European
Commission on Human Rights. The Commission issued its report on
the charges made in the first two applications on July 10, 1976.
In it,
the Commission found Turkey guilty of violating the following articles
of the European Convention on Human Rights:
1. Article 2—by the
killing of innocent civilians committed on a substantial scale;
2.
Article 3—by the rape of women of all ages from 12 to 71;
3. Article
3—by inhuman treatment of prisoners and persons detained;
4. Article
5—by deprivation of liberty with regard to detainees and missing
persons—a continuing violation;
5. Article 8—by displacement of
persons creating more than 170,000 Greek Cypriot refugees, and
by refusing to allow the refugees
to return to their homes—a continuing violation;
6. Article
1 of the First Protocol to the Convention—by deprivation of possessions,
looting and robbery on an extensive scale.
On January 23, 1977,
the London Sunday Times published excerpts of the report and stated: "It amounts to a massive indictment of the Ankara government for the murder, rape
and looting by its army in Cyprus during and after the Turkish invasion
of summer 1974."
At a dinner in honor of Cyprus President George Vassiliou at
the Kennedy Library on September 21, 1990, Senator Edward M. Kennedy
(D-MA)
in his remarks
stated:
"We are all familiar with the unconscionable invasion by Turkish troops in 1974
and the Turkish occupation of the northern part of Cyprus, which
continues to this day. The Bush Administration must give higher priority
to Cyprus in
America’s foreign policy. Aggression is aggression is aggression.
President Bush has made it clear that Iraq’s invasion and occupation
of Kuwait is unacceptable.
And it is time he made clear to Turkey that their invasion and occupation
of Cyprus is just as unacceptable. . . . We know the speed with which
productive
change can come, and we hope that it will come to Cyprus soon. In
less than two weeks, East will meet West when Germany unites. It
is also time for North
to meet South on Cyprus. The Wall has disappeared in Berlin, and
the Green Line must disappear in Cyprus."
Why haven’t the Turkish military leaders and political leaders
of 1974 been brought before a War Tribunal for their aggression
and war crimes?
Compensation from Turkey for the victims of Turkey’s
aggression?
There is talk of compensating the Iraqi victims of torture
at the hands of a small number of U.S. servicepersons at the
Al Ghraid jail. Why hasn’t the Annan Plan provided compensation
from
Turkey for the Greek Cypriot victims of Turkey’s aggression?
We
cite the compensation paid by the government of Germany to holocaust
victims and to the state of Israel and
the government
of Japan to the victims of its actions in Asia before and during
World War II. We call on the U.S. government to press Turkey
to pay compensation:
• to the victims of Turkey's illegal
invasion of Cyprus of 1974;
• to the owners of property in Cyprus
illegally taken, occupied and used by the Turkish authorities
and individuals since
1974;
• to the victims of the September 1955 Turkish
pogrom against its Greek citizens in Istanbul;
• to the victims
of the Turkish genocide against the Pontian ( Black Sea) Greeks
in the 1920's and
• to the victims of the Turkish massacre of
the Greek and Armenian populations of Smyrna (now Izmir) in
1922 under Kemal Ataturk's
orders.
Turkey, under threat of expulsion from the Council
of Europe, finally complied with the ruling of the European Court
and paid the
judgment of
the European Court of Human Rights which awarded $1.3 million in
damages to Titina
Loizidou for the violation of her property rights in the occupied
area in connection with Turkey’s illegal invasion of Cyprus in 1974
and
its continuing
illegal
occupation. It demonstrates that forceful action regarding Turkey
will bring results. We call for payments to all similarly situated
Greek
Cypriots and
other owners of property in the occupied area, including American
owners.
The pro-Turkish bias in the Annan Plan
One does not
have to read Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s 22 page Report of May
28,
2004, on his mission of good
offices in Cyprus or Cyprus President Tassos Papadopoulos’ 7 page
reply on June 7, 2004, to understand the pro-Turkish bias in the
Annan Plan. In reading the Annan Plan it is clear that it was written
to satisfy Turkey. The Reuter’s news agency reported that a Turkish
diplomat told reporters: "We cannot imagine a solution more marvelous than this, we got everything we wanted.
[The Greeks] lost, it’s that simple."
I did read the Secretary-General’s Report and President
Papadopoulos’ effective reply, and concluded that the pro-Turkish
bias is even worse than
I had thought. I urge you to read Mr. Papadopoulos’ reply.
Why did Britain
and the U.S. press for the pro-Turkish provisions at the expense
of the 80 percent Greek Cypriot majority?
The British have economic interests
in Turkey they want to protect and there are a number of British
property owners with
illegal title to
Greek Cypriot properties in the occupied north. The British would also
like to
erase the Turkish invasion because of Britain’s failure, as a guarantor
power, to
deter Turkey’s invasion as required under the Treaty of Guarantee.
The
U.S. pro-Turkish position is generally considered to be linked
to Israel. The Turkey-Israel military cooperation arrangement
was entered
into according to the late Professor Amos Perlmutter to provide jobs
and profits
for the Israeli defense industry and was not aimed at Greece. (Remarks
at an American Hellenic Institute forum on June 21, 1999.) In a joint
letter to President
Bush on May 17, 2004, we set forth the reasons why the Turkey-Israel
military cooperation understanding is not in the best interests of
the U.S. or Israel.
Please see the AHI Web site at www.ahiworld.org for the text. A second
reason
was to wipe out the Turkish invasion of 1974 and cover-up the U.S.
role in that invasion. A third reason was to help Turkey get a date
for EU
accession negotiations.
Mr. Secretary, you have been misled
Frankly, Mr. Secretary you have been
and are being misled as to the alleged fairness and balance in
the Annan Plan. The official in the State Department responsible
for
characterizing the Annan Plan as fair and balanced is the Under
Secretary for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, the highest ranking
career
official in the Department.
Mr. Grossman has been the point man
on U.S. policy towards Cyprus, as well as Greece and Turkey, for
years, going back to
August 1997 when he was appointed Assistant Secretary for European
Affairs.
When he was Director General of the Foreign Service and Director
of Human Resources from June 2000 to February 2001, he took it
upon himself to testify before Congress on Greece, Turkey and
Cyprus matters.
In March 2001 he was sworn in as Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs. The State Department website states that the:
"The Under Secretary is the Department's day-to-day manager of overall regional
and bilateral policy issues, and is responsible for integrating political,
economic, global, and security issues into the U.S.’ bilateral relationships.
There are six geographically defined bureaus and one functional bureau
that report to the Under Secretary—bureaus for Africa, East Asia
and the Pacific,
Europe and Eurasia, the Near East, South Asia, the Western Hemisphere,
and International Organizations."
Mr. Grossman has initiated or approved
every memorandum to you on the Cyprus issue. That is, of course,
standard operating procedure
and is
well-known
in the bureaucracy but not well-known to the general public. On third
level issues, such as the Cyprus issue, the memoranda and oral comments
from
the Under Secretary are usually the basis for the Secretary’s final
policy position.
Mr. Grossman is also responsible for the comments
of Department officials attacking President Papadopoulos and the
Greek Cypriots for
their no vote
and praising the Turkish Cypriots for their yes vote and the Department’s
position
of punishing the Greek Cypriots and rewarding the Turkish Cypriots.
Senator
Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, has stated:
"The criticism expressed by some EU leaders and some elements within our own government
is both unwarranted and counterproductive. The vote reflected widespread
and deep concern in the Greek Cypriot community over the deficiencies
in the plan’s
provisions. It is a setback but not a defeat where a settlement
is concerned."
As I understand negotiations and diplomacy, the normal
and usual reaction should have been to set out the areas of agreement
and disagreement
and to
stress the need to continue efforts to reach agreement.
Yet Mr.
Grossman, instead of respecting the democratic process and the
overwhelming majority "no" vote of 76 percent, pounced on the vote result to initiate attacks on the Greek
Cypriots and President Papadopoulos and praise Turkey and the Turkish
Cypriots. This reaction was not only unseemly and undiplomatic but
can be characterized
as
negligent and incompetent diplomacy in view of the facts and
past history.
It is all the more regrettable when one considers that
the Greek Cypriots have given substantial support to U.S. efforts
in
the region
over the years
while Turkey has not and has actually harmed U.S. efforts.
President
George W. Bush stated to a Greek American audience on April 1,
2004, regarding the Cyprus referenda on April 24,
2004, that "We will not tell them how to vote."
Yet Mr. Grossman authorized Ambassador Thomas Weston,
the Department’s Cyprus Coordinator, to state before the April
24,
2004 vote, that the
Annan Plan was the final chance for a settlement, that this
was it with no changes.
What kind of diplomacy is this—threats and direct interference
in the voting process of another nation? The Cyprus issue will
not go
away as
long as Turkey
continues its illegal occupation of Cyprus with 40,000 troops.
Do we interfere in French or German votes? Only in little Cyprus
do
we intervene.
Laurence Stern, a distinguished foreign news editor
of the Washington Post, wrote in his book The Wrong Horse (1977
at page
7):
"One of the most important keys to an understanding of the Cyprus muddle is the
realization that the United States, far from being a disinterested
broker to the disputes of the past, was a deeply involved participant."
Lord Hanney, the former British envoy to Cyprus, said
that not reaching a resolution by May 1 was "not the end of the world" and that negotiations are available after May 1, 2004, the date Cyprus became
a full member of the EU.
President Papadopoulos has stated repeatedly
that the Greek Cypriots and he personally are committed to
the solution
of a bizonal,
bicommunal
federation. Their rejection of the Annan Plan was not a rejection
of a proper solution.
Yet Mr. Grossman has tried to stigmatize the Greek Cypriots
as obstructionists.
It is to be noted that the UN Special Advisor
to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, Mr. Alvaro de Soto, recently
said: "We will need time to evaluate what happened and we would especially like to know
why the Greek Cypriots voted the way they did and what they
want in the future."
These recent actions of the State Department have brought
into bold relief the policy for years of a double standard
on the rule of
law and appeasement
of Turkey without regard to U.S. values and principles
and without regard as to the impact of these actions on other
bilateral relations
and U.S.
worldwide interests.
These actions of the State Department
also reveal and bring into sharp focus the efforts of State to
cover-up the
U.S. role
in Turkey’s
invasion of
Cyprus in 1974 and to wipe out Turkey’s aggression.
Cover-up of the State Department’s role in Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974
Turkey’s
use of American-supplied arms and equipment in its aggression
against Cyprus was not in accordance with the purposes of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961. Section 502 of that Act limits the use of
assistance to internal security, legitimate self-defense and regional
and collective defensive arrangements. Furthermore, Turkey did not
seek or obtain the requisite formal consent from the U.S. to use
our arms for purposes not provided for in the Foreign Assistance
Act and Foreign Military Sales Act. As a result, Turkey was acting
in violation of section 505(d) of the Act and section 3(c) of the
Foreign Military Sales Act and became "immediately ineligible" for further military assistance and sales.
Kissinger, as Secretary of State,
was the primary official responsible for implementation of section
505(d) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 and section 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act
of the U.S. Except for the President, Kissinger had final authority
regarding these particular laws.
Kissinger continued to authorize
arms shipments to Turkey following Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus.
He failed to declare Turkey "immediately ineligible" for further assistance and sales as required under the plain language of section
505(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act and section 3(c) of the Foreign
Military Sales Act. This was a violation of section 505(d) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and section 3(c) of the Foreign
Military Sales Act. This clear and deliberate violation of U.S.
laws led Congress
to pass the embargo legislation against Turkey. Kissinger also
violated his constitutional oath of office to faithfully uphold
and execute
the laws of the U.S.
Kissinger not only acted illegally, but he
also failed to deter the Greek junta from its planned coup against
President
Makarios.
Kissinger’s actions prior to the invasion encouraged Turkey to
invade Cyprus in July 1974, and his actions thereafter further
encouraged
Turkey to renew its aggression on August 14, 1974. The Los Angeles
Times reported that Kissinger knew in advance that the Turks planned
to invade Cyprus in July 1974. Nevertheless, Kissinger rejected
an appeal from the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Henry Tasca, to use
the
U.S. Sixth Fleet to stop the invasion.
In an editorial, the New
York Times put the responsibility for the tragic events in Cyprus
on Kissinger’s shoulders. The editorial
stated in part:
"A Library of Congress analysis of pertinent legislation, inserted in the Congressional
Record by Representative John Brademas of Indiana, supports the contention
of Mr. Brademas and three colleagues in a letter to Mr. Kissinger
that the cut off in aid to Turkey "is not discretionary as a matter of policy, but is mandatory under the terms
of the Foreign Assistance Act. . . .
"Senator Thomas F. Eagleton of Missouri charges that President Ford is being deliberately
kept "uninformed" of the mandatory cutoff for Turkey "in order to protect erroneous policy judgments made by the foreign affairs bureaucracy." But it has been not so much the State Department bureaucracy that has so bungled
American policy in the Cyprus crisis as Mr. Kissinger himself.
"The stalling on the aid cutoff, in violation of the laws, is of a piece with
Washington’s earlier unwillingness to condemn Greece’s disintegrating
junta for the coup against the legal Government of Cyprus—a reluctance
that encouraged Turkey to intervene on the island. It is also consistent
with Washington’s refusal to condemn Turkey’s subsequent massive
occupation of a third of Cyprus in flagrant breach of solemn cease-fire
pledges.
"Senator Eagleton, Representative Brademas and their colleagues are to be applauded
for persisting in their demand for an end to Mr. Kissinger’s illegal
appeasement of Turkish aggression." (N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1974, at A28, col. 1).
A review of the sequence of events
leading up to the crisis is instructive. After the foiled assassination
attempt against
Cypriot President Makarios on July 15, 1974, and the coup against
his government,
the British flew Makarios to London to meet with Prime Minister
Harold Wilson. The Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, stated
that they
were "following the situation closely with the Turkish authorities," that it was a Greek Cypriot affair and that the Turkish Cypriots should "not . . . interfere in any way."
Meanwhile, Nicos Sampson, an ultra-rightist and discredited
former member of the Greek Cypriot national liberation movement
EOKA, was installed as President of Cyprus. The coup and Sampson’s
appointment
were condemned by Britain and other nations throughout the world,
except the U.S.
While Britain was meeting with Makarios and condemning
Sampson and the coup, Kissinger gave Turkey both time and the purported
reason
to invade Cyprus. Kissinger did not criticize the coup and the
assassination attempt against President Makarios. In fact, Kissinger
sought and
obtained a postponement of the UN Security Council meeting from
Monday, July 15, 1974, the day of the coup, to Friday, July 19,
1974. (Christian
Science Monitor, July 19, 1974, at 1, col.2.) On Wednesday, July
17, 1974 Kissinger instructed the U.S. Ambassador in Nicosia to
meet with the foreign minister of the renegade Sampson government,
and
had a "high American official" leak to the New York Times that the U.S. was leaning towards Sampson. That leak
was the lead story on page 1, column 8 of the New York Times on
July 18, 1974. Turkey invaded in the early hours of July 20, 1974.
Subsequently,
the UN accorded Makarios head of state status when he addressed
the General Assembly on July 19, 1974, but Kissinger
failed to do the same when Makarios met with him three days later
at the State Department.
Kissinger undermined the UN-sponsored negotiations
and cease-fire by approving a statement on August 13, 1974 issued
by
State Department
spokesman Robert Anderson. The statement said that the "Turkish community on Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection" even though there was no evidence of any threat to the Turkish Cypriot community.
The statement appeared to offer U.S. support for the Turkish government
ultimatum of August 13, 1974 which was tantamount to partition
and was followed the next day, August 14, 1974, by renewed Turkish
aggression
when Turkish forces broke out of the four percent of Cyprus they
controlled and occupied an additional thirty-three percent of Cyprus.
That action occurred three weeks after the legitimate government
of Cyprus had been restored on July 23, 1974 with acting President
Glafkos Clerides.
Because U.S. arms assistance was continuing and
Kissinger was telling the world that the position of the Turkish
Cypriots
needed "considerable improvement and protection," the Turkish government had no incentive to negotiate a reasonable and fair solution.
If
the U.S. had joined Britain and the other members of the Security
Council in immediate condemnation of the coup and
in supporting
Makarios as the elected leader of Cyprus, the Sampson government
would have fallen before the end of the week. This would have removed
any possible excuse for Turkey to invade Cyprus. Coincidentally,
it would have finished the Greek junta government as well. In any
event, had the U.S. actively opposed Sampson, Turkey’s aggression
would have been prevented.
Kissinger never informed Turkey that
the Foreign Assistance Act would be invoked and aid to Turkey
would cease if Turkey invaded
Cyprus. Instead, Kissinger’s actions kept the Sampson government
afloat long enough for Turkey to prepare and invade Cyprus. Former
Under Secretary of State Ball testified before Congress that the
U.S. should have publicly denounced the Greek junta-initiated coup
against Makarios and told Greece: "You have got to unscramble this coup and restore constitutional government," while at the same time saying to Turkey, "You’ve got to hold off while we work this situation out." (Cyprus Hearings 1974, House Committee on Foreign Affairs at pages 40-41.)
In
congressional testimony approximately one year later, Mr. Cyrus
Vance, who was later to become Secretary of State in
the Carter administration, stated:
"I would have acted differently than the Government did under these circumstances.
It seemed to me that once the legitimate constitutional government
of Cyprus was overthrown by a coup that the first and clear step
that the U.S. should have taken was to denounce that action and
state very clearly that it expected the constitutional government
to be
restored. This would have been in conformity with what Great Britain
had publicly stated and with what our other NATO allies had said." (House Committee on International Relations—name changed—1975 Cyprus Hearings,
at page 51; N.Y. Times, July 11, 1975, at A2, col.3.)
Because of
Kissinger’s refusal to halt arms shipments to Turkey, legislation
was introduced in the House and Senate in September
1974, to enforce the law by embargoing arms to Turkey. From September
to December, 1974, there were over a dozen votes in the House
and Senate on the embargo that culminated in a congressionally
enacted
embargo in December 1974.
Throughout the congressional battle
Kissinger and the State Department fought the embargo legislation.
Kissinger personally
lobbied Congressmen and Senators. After the embargo went into
effect,
the
Administration immediately undermined its force by stating
that legislation would be introduced to repeal it.
By not enforcing
the penalty provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act and the
Foreign Military Sales Act against Turkey,
Kissinger
violated laws that go to the very heart of U.S. foreign policy.
This policy, that weapons and aid from the U.S. are not to
be used for
offensive strikes, is fundamental not only to American foreign
policy, but is also central to the purposes underlying the
UN Charter, namely,
that disputes be settled peacefully and not by the threat
or use of force.
The cover-up by the State Department of the U.S.
role in Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974 has continued
to the
present time.
______________
For all the reasons set forth above, the Annan
Plan was unfair, unbalanced, unworkable, not financially
viable,
rewarded the aggressor, Turkey, and punished the victims,
the Greek Cypriots.
For the State Department to contend otherwise is Orwellian.
The
Greek Cypriots worked hard and abided by the rule of law to
pull themselves up from the destruction,
killings and rapes
caused by the Turkish
military in 1974 and thereafter. They have supported the U.S.
throughout this period, particularly in the Persian Gulf War
period
in
1990 and 1991 and the
Iraq War of 2003 while Turkey did not. The Greek Cypriots deserve
better from the U.S. and the UN.
The U.S. should muster
the political will (1) to apply diplomatic and economic pressure
on Turkey
to remove
promptly
its 35,000/40,000 troops
and
settlers from Cyprus, and (2) to apply the American principles
of majority rule, the rule of law and protection
of minority rights to Cyprus as
we have to Afghanistan.
Mr. Secretary, I do not believe
that you have been adequately briefed on the facts and history
of
the Cyprus
problem and their important bearing
on the Annan Plan.
I am sending a copy of this letter to the
President.
Sincerely,
/s/Gene Rossides
cc: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snow
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
UN Ambassador John D. Negroponte
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Lee Armitage
Chief of Staff Andrew Card
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice
Senior Advisor to the President Karl Rove
Advisor to the President Karen Hughes
Director of OMB Joshua Bolten
Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs A. Elizabeth Jones
Special Coordinator for Cyprus Thomas Weston
The Congress
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
UN Under-Secretary-General Alvaro de Soto,
Special Advisor on Cyprus
###
For additional information, please contact Vivian Basdekis at (202) 785-8430 or at [email protected]. For
general information about
the activities
of AHI, please see our Web site at http://www.ahiworld.org.
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